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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (k) and 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendants Harvey
and Jo Ann Rogers owed no duty to plaintiff?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1992).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(36) (1991).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-209 (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a negligence action against defendant Billy
Rogers and his parents Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers.

Plaintiff and

Billy Rogers participated in an unauthorized drinking party at the
home of defendants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers while Mr. and Mrs.

1

Rogers were out of town.
left the party

Plaintiff and Billy Rogers eventually

in Billy's automobile

and were

involved

in an

accident.

Plaintiff filed suit against both Billy Rogers and his

parents.

Plaintiff

entered

into a settlement with Billy, but

continues to pursue his claim against Billy's parents.

Plaintiff

charged Mr. and Mrs. Rogers with liability under both the Utah
Dramshop Act and under a common law negligence theory.

Mr. and

Mrs. Rogers moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Utah
Dramshop Act does not apply to social hosts and also that Mr. and
Mrs. Rogers owed no duty to plaintiff.
abandoned

At oral argument plaintiff

his claim under the Utah Dramshop Act and proceeded

solely on his negligence claim.

(R. Ill). The trial court agreed

that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers did not owe a duty to plaintiff and
consequently awarded summary judgment to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff

began consuming

(Shane Strong Depo., p. 9) .
drunkenness

every weekend

alcohol at the age of 14.

Plaintiff drank to the point of

and also drank throughout the week.

(Shane Strong Depo., p. 13). Plaintiff also began using drugs and
smoked approximately five joints of marijuana a day.

(Shane Strong

Depo., p. 12).
2.

The

following

year

plaintiff

continued

his

drinking

habits and increased his use of marijuana to 12 joints a day.
Plaintiff also began using LSD and Cocaine nearly every other day.
(Shane Strong Depo., p. 14).

2

3.

Plaintiff

committing crimes.

financed

his

drug

and

alcohol

(Plaintiff's Depo., p. 15),

habits

by

At one point

plaintiff hid from the police for five months before being arrested
and confined to a lock-up facility.
4.

(Shane Strong Depo., pp. 7-9) .

By the time of the accident plaintiff was drunk nearly

every day.

(Shane Strong Depo., p. 16). Plaintiff also continued

his use of marijuana and LSD on a regular basis.

(Shane Strong

Depo., pp. 16-17).
5.

At the time of his deposition plaintiff was living in a

group home for his drug and

alcohol problems.

Plaintiff

was

sentenced to the home when he came before a judge on criminal
charges.

(Shane Strong Depo., pp. 5-6).

6.
Rogers.

Billy Rogers is the son of defendants Harvey and Jo Ann
(Complaint f 7, R. 2 ) .

7.

Billy Rogers was 19 years old at all times material to

this action.
8.

(Depo. of Billy Rogers, p. 4 ) .

In April

apartment.

or

May

of

1989

Billy

(Jo Ann Rogers Depo., p. 5 ) .

moved

into

his

own

On July 7, 1989 Billy

went back to his parents' home to care for his parents' home and
pets

while

children.
6) .

his

parents

were

away

on

vacation

visiting

other

(Billy Rogers' Depo., p. 10,; Depo. Jo Ann Rogers, p.

While plaintiff claims that Billy had moved back into his

parents' home, this fact is immaterial for purposes of defendant's
motion for summary judgment.
9.

Before Mr. and Mrs. Rogers left they gave both plaintiff

and Billy clear, unequivocal instructions that (1) no drinking was
3

to occur in the home; and (2) none of Billy's friends were to stay
in the home.
10.

(Billy Rogers Depo., p. 10).

Plaintiff was present when Mr. and Mrs. Rogers issued the

above orders and agrees that the orders were given.

(Shane Strong

Depo., pp. 31, 35, 36, 39 and 52).
11.

Plaintiff knew that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were serious when

they ordered plaintiff and Billy not to drink in the house.

(Shane

Strong Depo., p. 52).
12.

Despite

orders

to

the

contrary,

Plaintiff

and

Billy

decided to have a drinking party in the Rogers' home on the evening
of Friday, July 8, 1989.
13.

(Shane Strong Depo., p. 39).

Plaintiff and Billy Rogers both knew that the drinking

party they hosted was in direct violation of the orders given by
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers.
14.

(Shane Strong Depo., p. 39).

Plaintiff and Billy both knew that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers

would not have allowed the party if they had been present.

They

would have stopped the party and ordered everyone out of the home.
(Shane Strong Depo., pp. 39-40; Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 16-17).
15.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. Billy left plaintiff in the

Rogers home and took his car to pick up some friends and to get
some beer.
16.

(Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 11, 43).
Billy picked up a few of his friends and then stopped at

a Circle K on the way home to buy some beer (Billy Rogers Depo.,
pp. 34-35).
17.

One of Billy's friends, Tom, was old enough to legally

purchase alcohol.

Billy and another friend provided money to Tom,
4

who then went into Circle K and purchased a case of beer.

(Billy

Rogers Depo., pp. 35-36).
18.
and

the

When Billy returned to the Rogers home with his friends
beer

he

found

plaintiff

and

an

uninvited

friend

of

plaintiff, Eric Taylor, drinking alcohol belonging to Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers.

(Billy Rogers Depo., p. 11).

Prior to that time Billy

Rogers' friends had never consumed Mr. and Mrs. Rogers' liquor.
(Billy Rogers Depo., p. 44).
19.

Billy

claims

to

have

been

"very

perturbed"

discovering that plaintiff had stolen his parents' liquor.

upon
(Billy

Rogers Depo., p. 11).
20.

There is a dispute as to whether Billy allowed plaintiff

to drink Mr. and Mrs. Rogers' alcohol.

(Billy Rogers Depo., p. 11;

Shane Strong Depo., p. 28). However, the dispute is not material
to this motion because both plaintiff and Billy acknowledge that
they were not authorized to drink any alcohol in the Rogers' home,
including the alcohol belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers.

(Billy

Rogers Depo., p. 10; Shane Strong Depo., pp. 31, 35, 36, 39, 52).
21.

While in his parents' home Billy consumed approximately

12 beers, or one-half of the case that was purchased by Billy and
his friends.
22.

(Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 44-47, 57).

As the evening wore on both plaintiff and Billy became

intoxicated.

(Billy Rogers Depo., pp. 46-47; Shane Strong Depo.,

p. 38).
23.

Later in the evening plaintiff and Billy left in Billy's

car to take a friend for a ride.

After the friend was dropped off
5

plaintiff occupied the front passenger seat of the vehicle. (Billy
Rogers Depo., p. 13).
24.

While driving his vehicle Billy Rogers had an accident

resulting in injuries to himself and to plaintiff.

(Billy Rogers

Depo., p. 14) .
25.

The car involved in the accident was owned and insured by

Billy Rogers.

(Jo Ann Rogers Depo., p. 30).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers cannot be liable for
negligence because they owed no duty to plaintiff.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that, absent a special relationship, an
individual has no duty to protect another from a third-party's
negligence.

Mr. and Mrs. Rogers had no special relationship with

either plaintiff or Billy. Consequently defendants owed no duty to
plaintiff and summary judgment can be granted as a matter of law.
Plaintiff claims that a duty exists because Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers allowed Billy to remain in their home with knowledge of
Billy's drinking habits.

This amounts to nothing more than an

argument for social host liability.

This court and the courts of

nearly every other state have flatly rejected all notions of social
host liability.

The clear majority rule is that property owners

are not liable for the torts of their intoxicated guests, even
though the property owners allowed their guests to consume alcohol
on the premises.

Social hosts do not have a special relationship

with their adult guests so as to give rise to a duty of protection
to third parties.
6

The fact that Billy is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers is also
insufficient
protection.
old.

to

create

a

special

relationship

and

a

duty

of

At all times relevant hereto Billy Rogers was 19 years

Virtually every case considering this issue has held that

parents have no duty to prevent their adult children from becoming
intoxicated, even when the adult child is under legal drinking age
and even when the alcohol is consumed in the parents' home with
their knowledge.
Plaintiff similarly cannot impose liability upon Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers by showing that they furnished Billy with alcohol.

The

undisputed facts of this case show that the alcohol Billy consumed
was purchased by Billy and his friends.

If any of Mr. and Mrs.

Roger's liquor was consumed it was stolen rather than furnished by
these defendants.

In any event, it is clear that the furnishing of

liquor by a social host is actionable only when authorized by a
Dramshop Act. Utah's Dramshop Act has been specifically amended to
preclude social host liability.

Consequently a social host is not

liable for furnishing alcohol to adults in Utah.
Plaintiff

has completely

failed to establish any type of

special relationship sufficient to impose a duty of protection upon
Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. Consequently Mr. and Mrs. Rogers owed no duty
to plaintiff.

The trial court correctly reached this conclusion

and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I - IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP, MR. AND MRS. ROGERS OWED NO DUTY
TO PLAINTIFF.
"Establishing [that] the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty
of care is an essential element of a negligence claim".

Lamarr v.

Utah State Dept. of Trans., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah App. 1992).
"Without a showing of duty, a plaintiff cannot recover."
537-38.

Id. at

"Whether the defendant owed a plaintiff a duty of care is

entirely a question of law to be determined by the court."

Id. at

538.
In this case plaintiff was injured by the negligent driving of
Billy

Rogers.

Defendants

Harvey

and

Jo Ann

involved with the driving of Billy's vehicle.
claimr

Rogers

were

not

However, plaintiff

that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers should have protected plaintiff

from Billy's negligence by prohibiting Billy from accessing the
Rogers'

home

because

Billy

was

a

known

abuser

of

alcohol.

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers breached their duty of
protection by allowing their adult son to remain in their home
unattended.

Plaintiff's arguments fail as a matter of law.

As provided in § 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts, Mr.
and Mrs. Rogers did not have a duty to protect plaintiff from Billy
Rogers' negligent conduct.

Such a duty can only exist where Mr.

and Mrs. Rogers have a special relationship with plaintiff or
Billy:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of
a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless
8

(a) a special relationship exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third
person's conduct, or
(b) a special relationship exists between
the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965)•
As this court has acknowledged, "the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. . . .
v. Graham. 821 P.2d 1185, 1190 n.2 (Utah App. 1991).

"

Sneddon

One example

is found in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
The plaintiff
University of Utah.

in Beach was a 2 0 year old student at the
The plaintiff enrolled in a biology class

taught by Cuellar that required weekend field trips.

During one

field trip Cuellar and his students began drinking alcohol.

While

intoxicated the plaintiff became disorientated and wandered over a
cliff.

The plaintiff sued Cuellar and the University of Utah for

negligence. The defendants moved for and received summary judgment
on the grounds that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff.
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the award of summary
judgment to the defendants.

The Supreme Court explained that,

absent a special relationship, an individual has no duty to protect
another from the effects of intoxication:
Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another. Absent unusual
circumstances which justify imposing such an
affirmative responsibility, one has no duty to
look after the safety of another who has
become
voluntarily
intoxicated
and
thus
limited his ability to protect himself. The
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty
9

to act only when certain special relationships
exist between the parties. These relationships generally arise when one assumes
responsibility
for
another's
safety
or
deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. The essence of
a special relationship is dependence by one
party upon the other or mutual dependence
between the parties.
Id, at 415-16 (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted).
The supreme court next concluded that no special relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the defendants, even though the
defendants knew of the plaintiff's propensity to abuse alcohol:
The primary thrust of Beach's claim before
this court . . . is that . . . Cuellar knew or
should have known of her propensity to become
disoriented after drinking. Because of this
knowledge, Beach maintains that the University
had a special duty to supervise her on the
evening in question. We do not agree that any
special duty arose by reason of Cuellar's
knowledge.
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
The court additionally found that a special relationship did
not arise from the fact that the defendants allowed the plaintiff
to consume alcohol, even though she was under age.

The court

pointed out that the plaintiff was legally an adult, even though
she was too young to legally consume alcohol:
The students whose relationship to the
University we are asked to characterize as
"custodial" are not juveniles. Beach was 2 0
years of age at the time of the accident. She
may have been denied the right to drink by
Utah law, but in virtually all other respects
she was entitled to be treated as an adult.

10

It would be unrealistic to impose upon an
institution of higher education the additional
role of custodian over its adult students and
to charge it with responsibility for preventing students from illegally consuming
alcohol and, should they do so, with responsibility for assuring their safety and the
safety of others.
* * *

A realistic assessment of the nature of the
relationship
between
the
parties
here
precludes our finding that a special relationship existed between the University and Beach
or other adult students.
Id. at 418-19.
The instant case is identical to Beach in every material
respect and is thus controlled by that opinion.

As in Beach,

plaintiff is suing Mr. and Mrs. Rogers for failing to protect him
from the effects of Billy's voluntary intoxication.

As in Beach,

plaintiff claims that defendants are under a duty of care because
of their knowledge that Billy had a propensity to abuse alcohol.
As in Beach, the parties consuming the alcohol were adults, even
though they were under age for purposes of alcohol consumption.
Each of plaintiff's arguments have already been considered and
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

Consequently, the award of

summary judgment to these defendants must be affirmed.
POINT II — NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS SO
AS TO GIVE RISE TO A DUTY OF CARE.
As demonstrated, a duty of protection will only be imposed
upon Mr. and Mrs. Rogers after plaintiff shows the existence of a
special relationship.

Plaintiff cannot show such a relationship.

11

A.

No Special Relationship Arises From the Fact That Defendants
Allowed Billy to Remain in Their Home Unattended.
Plaintiff argues that a duty of protection must be imposed

upon Mr. and Mrs. Rogers because they allowed Billy to remain in
their home unattended even though he had a history of alcohol
abuse.

This

fact,

even

if

true, does

not

create

a

special

relationship so as to put Mr. and Mrs. Rogers under a duty of care,
as recognized by this court in Sneddon v. Graham. 821 P. 2d 1185
(Utah App. 1991).
The facts in Sneddon are similar to the facts of the instant
case.

In Sneddon an individual by the name of Wenkel was a guest

in the home of defendant Graham.

While visiting in the Graham home

Wenkel consumed eight cans of beer, some of which was provided by
Graham.

It was alleged that Graham allowed Wenkel to consume the

alcohol even after Graham knew Wenkel was intoxicated.
permitted Wenkel to drive home.

Graham then

On the way home Wenkel's vehicle

collided with a vehicle operated by Sneddon.

Sneddon filed suit

against both Wenkel and Graham for personal injuries under Utah's
Dramshop Act. Graham requested and was granted summary judgment on
the basis that Utah's Dramshop Act does not apply to social hosts.
Sneddon then filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a claim
for common law negligence (i.e. common-law social host liability).
This motion was denied by the trial court, which held that:
The court is of the opinion that there is not
a common law cause of action running in favor
of a person injured against a person who
supplied alcohol, nor does the court believe
that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act affords a plaintiff a
12

cause
of
action
under
the
facts
circumstances of this case. . . .

and

Id. at 1189 (quoting trial court).
On appeal the plaintiff argued that Graham, as a social host,
was liable under both the Utah Dramshop Act and the common law.
Both of these arguments were rejected by this court.

The court

first pointed out that the Dramshop Act applies only to commercial
suppliers of alcohol —

not to social hosts:

We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments, and
affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that
the Dramshop Act does not apply to individuals
in a non-commercial social setting.
Id. at 1188.
The court next addressed the merits of plaintiff's claim for
social host liability under the common law.

The court pointed out

that the Utah courts have never recognized a claim for common-law
social host liability.

The court further explained that, even if

such a claim was recognized, the plaintiff could not prevail under
such a theory because no special relationship

existed

between

Sneddon and Graham:
Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common
law action of negligence in the context of a
social host, an issue which had not been
addressed in the courts of this state to date.
However, we note the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
315, which states that no duty can be found to
protect another from harm unless and until a
special
relationship
exists
between
the
parties.
No such relationship has been
established between Sneddon and Graham.
Id. at 1190 n.2 (citing Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413
(Utah 1986)).
13

In the instant case plaintiff has simply asserted the same two
claims that were asserted in Sneddon:

1) that social hosts are

liable under the Utah Dramshop Act; and 2) that social hosts are
liable

under

a

common

law

negligence

theory.

Plaintiff

has

voluntarily withdrawn his first claim but continues to pursue the
second.

Sneddon directly controls both of the claims asserted in

plaintiff's complaint and consequently plaintiff's complaint must
be dismissed as a matter of law.

Plaintiff has even less grounds

for imposing social host liability than did Sneddon, due to the
fact that defendants were not physically present when the alcohol
was consumed and did not actively furnish alcohol and encourage its
consumption as did the social host in Sneddon.
Utah is by no means the only state to reject the notion of
common-law social host liability.

As pointed out by the Arizona

Court of Appeals, "Except for the State of New Jersey, all the
state courts that have considered the question of extending the
liability of the non-licensee, or social host, [have] declined to
do so. . . . "

Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc.. 801

P.2d 456, 459 (Ariz. App. 1990).

One example of the majority rule

is found in Walker v. Kennedy, 337 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1983).
In Walker the defendants, husband and wife, left their home
and children in the care of their 21-year old daughter Marianne.
The defendants expressly prohibited their children from hosting any
parties during the parents' absence.

Notwithstanding this fact

Marianne allowed her 16-year old sister to host a party for other
minors.

At the party alcohol was consumed and an individual named
14

Welin became intoxicated.

Welin left the party in his automobile

and later became involved in an accident with a snowmobile in which
the driver of the snowmobile was killed.

The deceased's estate

filed suit against the parent homeowners, claiming social host
liability.

The parents moved for summary judgment but their motion

was denied.
On appeal the decision of the trial court was reversed and
summary judgment was awarded to the parents. The court cited § 315
of the Second Restatement of Torts and held that the parents did
not owe a duty to the deceased.

The court explained that "it was

the conduct of a party with whom defendant did not have a special
relationship that caused the injury."

Id. at 255.

The court went on to explain that even Marianne, the 21-year
old

daughter

in charge

of

the

home, did

not

have

a

special

relationship with the plaintiff, in spite of the fact that she was
aware of her sister's propensity to host drinking parties:
We will briefly note two considerations that
concern the issue of Marianne's negligence.
First, there is no special relationship
between Marianne and Welin that would impose a
duty upon Marianne to control Welin's conduct.
Second, . . .
a propensity to provide a
location for parties, at which alcohol may be
consumed by minors, does not constitute a
dangerous propensity as contemplated by . . .
the Restatement.
Id. at 255 n.2.
Another
Dolezel,

example

383 N.W.2d

can be
148

found

in the

(Mich. App. 1985).

case

of Reinert

v.

In Reinert David

Dolezel and four of his friends held a drinking party at the home
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of David's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel. David and all but one of
his friends were 18 years old.

Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel were home

during the party but did not actively participate. After midnight
David and his friends left in Mr. Dolezel's car.

The plaintiffs

occupied the front and back seats of the vehicle.

While driving

David

failed

passenger

to negotiate

and

injuring

a curve and

another.

crashed, killing

Two separate

one

lawsuits were

initiated on behalf of the injured parties against Mr. and Mrs.
Dolezel.

The

complaints

alleged

that

"defendants

knowingly

permitted the use and consumption by under-aged individuals of
intoxicating beverages on or about their premises . . . causing
unsafe conditions without proper supervision."

Id. at 149-150.

However, both suits were dismissed at the trial level on the
grounds that Mr. and Mrs. Dolezel "had no common-law duty to
prevent their 18-year old son from drinking alcoholic beverages in
their home or to provide safe transportation for his similarly-aged
friends."

Id. at 149.

On appeal the award of summary judgment to the parents was
affirmed.

The court stated

that

"averments

that defendants

negligently supervised the dispensation and consumption of alcohol
by persons under 21 years of age do not state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted."

Xd. at 150. The court further

explained that parents do not have a duty to supervise illegal
activity conducted in their home by their adult children and other
adults:
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A person who is 18 years of age is deemed to
be an adult of legal age for all purposes
whatsoever and shall have the same duties,
liabilities, responsibilities, rights and
legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired
at 21 years of age, notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary.
These
people were not minors; they were adults who
were not old enough to drink alcoholic
beverages legally. Any duty the parents had
to supervise their child7s conduct ended when
that child became an adult.
To make homeowners civilly liable for illegal activity
being conducted by adults in their home, of
which the homeowners have no part, would be to
break new ground in . . . jurisprudence. The
problem of teenagers who drink and drive is a
serious one. But we know of no jurisdiction
which imposes a duty upon homeowners to stop
adults from illegally drinking in their home.
Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
In the

instant

case plaintiff

has

even

less grounds

for

asserting liability against Mr. and Mrs. Rogers than the plaintiff
did in Reinert, where the parents were present during the drinking
party and allowed their son to use their own automobile.

Such

aggravating circumstances are not present in this case.
Numerous other decisions have similarly refused to impose
liability in factually similar circumstances.

See e.g. Bruce v.

Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456 (Ariz. App. 1990)
(a defendant

who allows

another to become

premises owes no duty to a person

injured

intoxicated
by the

on his

intoxicated

individual); Johnston v. KFC Nat 7 !. Management Co., 788 P.2d 159,
162 (Haw. 1990) ("The clear trend has been a refusal to impose a
duty upon a social host to protect third parties from risk of
injuries that may be caused by an adult who is provided and served
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alcohol beverages."); Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App.
1989) (a plaintiff who is injured in an automobile accident with a
drunken driver has no cause of action against the persons who owned
the home where the alcohol was consumed, even though the drinking
party was hosted by the homeowner's 18 and 19 year old children;
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315); Alioto v. Marnell,
520 N.E.2d 1284 (Mass. 1988) (parents who knowingly allowed their
19 year old son to host a drinking party in their home are not
liable to persons injured or killed in a subsequent automobile
accident with the intoxicated son, even though the parents had
knowledge

of

their

son's

repeated

history

of

alcohol

abuse);

Bambino v. Dunn, 420 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. App. 1988) (persons owning
the home where a drinking

party was held are not liable to persons

injured in an automobile accident caused by a 19 year old guest who
had consumed alcohol at the party.); Christensen v. Parrish, 266
N.W.2d

826

(Mich. App.

1978)

(a homeowner

is not

liable

for

injuries sustained by a passenger in a vehicle driven by a drunken
minor, even though the minor became intoxicated at a drinking party
in the defendant's home with 4 he defendant's knowledge); Wiener v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Ore.
1971) (property owners who knowingly allowed fraternity to host
underage drinking party on the premises are not liable for injuries
sustained by a passenger in a vehicle driven by a minor who became
intoxicated at the party and subsequently collided his vehicle into
a building).
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As demonstrated by the overwhelming weight of authority, Mr.
and Mrs. Rogers are not liable to plaintiff for injuries inflicted
by their adult son, even though the injuries stem from their son's
consumption of alcohol in their home. Plaintiff has failed to cite
any authority to the contrary.

The five cases cited on pages 10

and 11 of plaintiff's brief are all easily distinguishable.
The first case cited by plaintiff is Garriup Constr. Co. v.
Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988).
arguments advanced by defendant:

Garriup actually supports the

"Most courts continue to refuse

to hold social hosts accountable for serving liquor to adults."
Id. at 1227.

"This court is unwilling to depart from the general

rule followed in most jurisdictions, and we hold that common law
liquor liability shall not be extended to the purely social host,
except in cases involving a breach of statutory duty."
1228.

Id. at

The reason the court in Garriup found liability was because

Indiana's Dramshop Act applied to non commercial parties (Id. at
1227) and because a special employer/employee relationship existed
between the plaintiff and the tort feasor.

Id. at 1229. The court

also found it significant that the employer had actually hosted the
party and furnished the alcohol.

Id. at 1226.

circumstances are present in the instant case.

None of these
The court should

note that Garriup was harshly criticized in Bruce v. Chas. Roberts
Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456, 463 (Ariz. App. 1990).
Plaintiff

next

cites

Transportation Co. , 820 F.2d

to

Acklev

263

(8th Cir. 1987).

absolutely no application to this case.
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v.

Chicago

&

N.W.

Ackley has

In Ackley an employee sued

his employer for failing to provide a ladder with rubberized safety
shoes.

There were no

drinking.

injured third-parties

and there was no

Indeed, the sole issue presented to the court did not

even involve the common law, but rather involved a legal issue
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA):

"We therefore

examine solely Ackley's claim that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury regarding the railroad's duties under FELA."
Id. at 2 66.
Plaintiff next cites to Dortman v. Lesterf

155 N.W.2d 1846

(Mich. 1968) an old case with a four-three split.

Dortman imposed

liability upon a father who allowed his son, an incompetent driver,
to drive a motor vehicle.

Dortman says nothing about whether a

parent can be liable for allowing a child to use the parent's home
to host a drinking party.
Finally, plaintiff cites to Maclearv v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081
(3rd Cir. 1987) and Morella v. Machu, 563 A.2d 881 (N.J. Super.
1989).

Plaintiff correctly acknowledges that both of these cases

are distinguishable.

(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11).

Unlike the

instant case, both Macleary and Morella involved the consumption of
alcohol by minors.

Morella acknowledges that the law differs with

respect to alcohol consumption by minors and adults.
563 A. 2d at 883.

See Morella,

Morella also comes from New Jersey, which has

been recognized as the only state extending liability to a social
host.

See Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d

456, 459

(Ariz. App. 1990).

With regard to Macleary the court

should note that the opinion did not consider the liability of the
20

homeowners, but rather
daughter who hosted

imposed

liability upon the 19-year old

the party.

Macleary

proposition that Billy Rogers is liable —

thus stands for the
not his parents.

As demonstrated, no special relationship is created when a
homeowner allows adults to have a drinking party on his premises.
Consequently
persons

from

the homeowner
being

is under no duty

injured

by

intoxicated

to protect

guests.

third

The trial

court's award of summary judgment to defendants must therefore be
upheld.
B.

No Special Relationship Arises From the Fact that Billy Rogers
is the Son of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers.
The fact that Billy Rogers is the 19-year old son of defen-

dants Harvey and Jo Ann Rogers does not give rise to a special
relationship sufficient to impose a duty of protection upon Mr. and
Mrs. Rogers.

At all times pertinent hereto Billy was an adult.

See Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1992) . Once Billy obtained adulthood
any special relationship

existing between him and his parents

ceased to exist, as demonstrated in Alioto v. Marnell, 520 N.E.2d
1284 (Mass. 1988).
In

Alioto

an

individual

named

Michael

Marnell

hosted

a

drinking party in the home of his parents. Michael was 19 years of
age at the time but continued to live in his parents home.
drinking

party

was

held

with

the

knowledge

and

approval

The
of

Michael's parents. The parents were aware that alcoholic beverages
would be consumed at the party.

Furthermore, the parents knew that

their son Michael had a propensity to drink and drive and that he
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had been involved in numerous prior incidents, one of which led to
the loss of his driver's license. Mr. and Mrs. Marnell nonetheless
consented to the party.

Michael became intoxicated at the party

and eventually drove off in his father's automobile. While driving
Michael collided with another automobile and killed the driver.
The driver's estate filed suit against Mr. and Mrs. Marnell for
negligence in allowing their son to host a drinking party.

The

suit was dismissed on the parents' summary judgment motion and the
plaintiff appealed.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the award of summary
judgment

to

Mr.

and

Mrs.

Marnell,

finding

that

no

special

relationship existed between the Marnells and their son so as to
put Mr. and Mrs. Marnell under a duty of protection:
The gravamen of the plaintiff's action is the
defendants' allegedly negligent failure to
supervise and control their son Michael's
actions.
A parent has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent his minor child
from intentionally or negligently inflicting
harm on others, where the parent knows or
should know of the child's propensity for a
particular type of harmful conduct and has the
opportunity to take reasonable corrective
measures. Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590,
592, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962).
The plaintiff
asks us to extend the rationale of Caldwell to
this case. We decline to do so.
In Caldwell, the plaintiff stated a good cause
of action for alleging that the defendants
knew or should have known of their minor
child's propensity to assault other children,
but did nothing to restrain such propensity.
Id. at 591-592, 183 N.E.2d 706. Here, there
were assertions that the defendants knew or
should have known of their son's propensity to
drink and drive, because he previously had
been involved in incidents involving drinking,
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and had
lost his driver's
license
for
operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.
Unlike the child in
Caldwell, however, at the time of this
incident. Michael Marnell, although below the
legal drinking age, was not a minor, but an
adult. He had graduated from high school some
17 months earlier, had been working full-time
for at least 14 months, and was in all
relevant aspects emancipated from his parents.
The fortuity of his living in his home does
not create a duty where none otherwise exists;
nor does their status as parents, without
more, impose on the defendants the duty to
supervise and control their emancipated adult
son.
Id. at 1285-86 (some emphasis added, some citations omitted).
The court explained that its holding was unaffected by the
fact that Michael Marnell was under legal drinking age:
The legal drinking age has little importance.
What is important is that Michael was an adult
for all purposes (except as to the legal
drinking age), that the defendants did not
serve or make alcoholic beverages available to
him, and that they violated no statute. The
imposition of liability for failure to supervise a competent adult child is unwarranted on
the facts of this case.
Id. at 1286 n.3.
A similar result was reached in Reinert v. Dolezel, 383 N.W.2d
148 (Mich. App. 1985), where the court stated:
Although plaintiff refers to the young people
involved in this case as 'minors' they were
not. At the time of this incident, decedent
Reinert was 19 years old, plaintiff Casco was
18 years old, as was defendant David Dolezel,
Jr. A person who is 18 years of age is deemed
to be an adult of legal age for all purposes
whatsoever and shall have the same duties,
liabilities, responsibilities, rights and
legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired
at 21 years of age, notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary.
These
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people were not minors; they were adults who
were not old enough to drink alcoholic
beverages legally. Any duty the parents had
to supervise their child's conduct ended when
that child became an adult. To make homeowners civilly liable for illegal activity
being conducted by adults in their home, of
which the homeowners have no part, would be to
break new ground in Michigan jurisprudence.
The problem of teenagers who drink and drive
is a serious one. But we know of no jurisdiction which imposes a duty upon homeowners
to stop adults from illegally drinking in
their home.
* * *

There is no duty to control the conduct of a
third party so as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless a special
relationship exists. . . . Parents are under
a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
their minor child, but this duty ends when the
child becomes an adult, and that happens in
Michigan at age 18.
Id. at 151 (emphasis added), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 315.
The facts of the instant case are no different than the
material facts contained in the preceding authorities.

The award

of summary judgment to Mr. and Mrs. Rogers should therefore be
affirmed.
POINT III — MR. AND MRS. ROGERS CANNOT BE
HELD LIABLE FOR FURNISHING ALCOHOL.
Plaintiff argues that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were under a duty of
care because they "went out of town and left [Billy] in charge of
a house stocked with alcohol."

Plaintiff's Brief, page 13.

Plaintiff insinuates that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished Billy with
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alcohol and should

therefore be held

liable.

This is simply

untrue.
The undisputed

facts of this case show that Mr. and Mrs.

Rogers prohibited both plaintiff and Billy from consuming any type
of alcohol on their premises.
Mrs. Rogers.

This included the alcohol of Mr. and

Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were

serious when they gave these instructions and that Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers would have kicked plaintiff out of their home if they had
been present when plaintiff consumed their alcohol.

Plaintiff

cannot seriously allege that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished alcohol
to plaintiff and Billy.

Any of Mr. and Mrs. Rogers 7 liquor that

was consumed was stolen, and not "furnished" by defendants.
Plaintiff would make defendants negligent for simply keeping
liquor in their home.

Such a fact does not constitute negligence,

as illustrated in Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App. 1989).
In Bowling two children, ages 18 and 19, held a beer party in
the home of their parents.
of liquor in their home.

The parents maintained a private stock
Although the parents were aware of the

party, they did not know that alcohol was being consumed.

A guest

eventually left the party in an intoxicated condition and, while
driving, struck the plaintiff's vehicle.

The plaintiff filed suit

against the parents for negligence alleging that "the mere presence
of the beer and

the

fact that

[the children] hosted

a party

[established] . . . that the [parents] furnished intoxicants to
[the guest]."

Id. at 514.

However, the

court rejected

plaintiff's arguments and found the parents not liable.
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the

The court

held that "even if the underage participants engaged in a common
scheme and drank from a common bottle [belonging to the parents],
it would not constitute furnishing."

Id.

The undisputed facts show that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers did not
furnish Billy with alcohol.

However, even if plaintiff

could

somehow show that the Rogers' did furnish Billy with alcohol, the
law would not provide plaintiff with a remedy against Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers.

At

common

law a person who

furnishes

alcohol

to an

intoxicated individual is not liable to third persons injured by
the intoxicated individual.

See Johnston v. KFC Nat'l. Management

Co. , 788 P.2d 159, 161 (Haw. 1990) ("Traditionally, the common law
held that when a person consumes alcohol to a point of being
intoxicated and injures another, he is the sole proximate cause of
that

injury.

Thus,

no

liability

could

be

attributed

to

the

supplier of the alcoholic beverages."); Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air
Conditioning, Inc. , 801 P.2d

456, 460

(Ariz. App. 1990)

("The

tavern owner, social host, and employer were not liable at common
law. . . . " ) .

A person can only be liable for furnishing alcohol

if a statute (i.e. a Dramshop Act) prohibits him from doing so.
The Utah Supreme Court seems to have recognized this principle:
Dictum in Yost suggests, however, that Utah
recognizes no common law right of action
against a provider of alcohol based upon the
fact that the alcohol was furnished in
violation of the law.
If this dictum is
accurate, any liability premised directly on
the illegal furnishing of alcohol would have
to arise from a statutory provision.
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417 n.3 (Utah 1986).
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Although

the

Utah

Dramshop

Act

originally

applied

to

homeowners, this court has recognized that the Act was subsequently
amended to limit its application to commercial suppliers of alcohol
only.

See Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 1188 n.l (Utah App.

1991) . See also Utah Code Ann. § 32a-14-191 (1991) ; Utah Code Ann.
§ 32A-1-105(36) (1991).

Plaintiff has acknowledged that he now has

no remedy under the Dramshop

Act.

(R. Ill).

The

amendment

reflects direct legislative intent to deny social host liability in
Utah.

If social host liability is to be reinstated, it should be

reinstated by the legislature and not by the courts:
The nature of the judicial role prevents us
from capably deciding the merits of social
host liability. Evaluating the overall merits
of social host liability, with its wide
sweeping implications, requires a balancing of
the costs and benefits for society as a whole,
not just the parties of any one case.
Social host liability implicates changes in
social
relations
in
a
society
where
consumption of alcohol is a pervasive and
deeply rooted part of our social life.
From an economic perspective, there needs to
be consideration of the effect social host
liability would
have on homeowners
and
renter's insurance rates, and the economic
impact on those not wealthy or foresighted
enough to obtain such insurance. Furthermore,
cost considerations are not limited to an
ultimate finding of liability against the
social host. A host will, in all probability,
be made a defendant in a civil suit for
damages and compensation brought by a third
person who is injured in a car accident
involving a* friend, invitee or guest of the
host who provided and served the alcoholic
beverage, thereby
incurring the cost of
defending against such a suit even though the
host may not be liable.
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Johnston v. KFC Nat 7 !. Management Co., 788 P.2d 159, 163-64 (Haw.
1990) (citations and quotations omitted).

See also Bruce v. Chas

Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., 801 P.2d 456, 460 (Ariz. App. 1990)
("Any

policy modifications which are designed to encompass the

potential liability of social providers of intoxicating beverages
should be left to the sound discretion of the legislature.").
In light of the foregoing authorities, and in light of the
undisputed facts, it is evident that defendants cannot be found
liable for furnishing alcohol to plaintiff or Billy.

Defendants'

motion for summary judgment should therefore be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff claims that defendants were negligent in allowing
their son Billy, a known abuser of alcohol, to remain in their home
unattended, thereby leading to his intoxication and the subsequent
injury of plaintiff.

Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law.

Absent a special relationship, Mr. and Mrs. Rogers owed no duty to
plaintiff. The foregoing authorities conclusively demonstrate that
Mr.

and

Mrs. Rogers

had

no

special

relationship

with

either

plaintiff or Billy.
The facts of this case are also insufficient to support a
finding that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers furnished alcohol to their son
Billy.

In any event, even if they had furnished alcohol, plaintiff

could not recover from Mr. and Mrs. Rogers because their claim is
not allowed under the Utah Dramshop Act.
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Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action against
these defendants.

Defendants therefore urge this court to affirm

the trial court's award of summary judgment.
DATED this /(/?

day of

/^&^Ut&fr^7

/ 1993.

"Paul M. B e l n a p /
David R. Nielson
Attorneys for Appellees
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Addendum

15-2-1. Period of minority.
The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen
years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. It is further provided
that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.

324-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribution of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action —
Statute of limitations — Employee protections.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person,
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from
the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 years;
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs;
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person.
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this
chapter.
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1).
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury.
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection
(1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.

32A-1-105.

rfinitions.

(36) "Premises means any building, enclosure, room, or equipment
used in connection with the sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products, unless otherwise defined in
this title or in the rules adopted by the commission.

32A-12-209. Unlawful purchase, possession, or consumption by minors.
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to purchase,
possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage or product, unless specifically
authorized by this title.
(2) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to misrepresent
his age, or for any other person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an alcoholic beverage or product
for a minor.
(3) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to possess or
consume any alcoholic beverage while riding in a limousine or chartered bus.
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STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Harvey and JoAnn Rogers
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7 080
Bernard L. Allen
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Co-counsel for Defendants
Harvey and JoAnn Rogers
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTINE DRYSDALE on behalf

of her minor son, SHANE STRONG,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs

Civil No. 900900166PI

BILLY J. ROGERS, HARVEY ROGERS
AND JO ANN ROGERS and JOHN
DOES 1-5,

Judge Ronald O. Hyde

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District Court Judge, at his
courtroom, Ogden, Utah, on the 7th day of May, 1992, at the hour
of 10:30 A.M., with the plaintiff being represented by his

counsel of record and the defendants Harvey and JoAnn Rogers
being represented by their counsel of record.
The matter was heard on defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The court reviewed the memoranda in support and in

opposition and heard the argument of counsel and issued its
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 14,
1992, and for good cause appearing, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the complaint of
plaintiff against defendants Harvey and JoAnn Rogers is hereby
dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants.
DATED this

day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

IM
Ronald O. Hyde
District Court Judge
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true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, first
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2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Bernard L. Allen
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Co-counsel for Defendants
Harvey and JoAnn Rogers
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTINE DRYSDALE,
\

vs.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

BILLY J. ROGERS, et ux.,

Case No.

Plaintiff,

\

Defendant.

900900166

MAY 1 4 1992

Plaintiff's cause of action against the parents of Billy
J. Rogers is based on common law liability.
The

uncontested

facts

show

that

the

subject

accident

occurred at roughly 3:30 a.m. on the morning of Saturday, July
9, 1989, At that time Billy Rogers was nineteen.
Billy

Rogers,

the

adult

son

of defendant's

Harvey

and

Joanne Rogers moved out of his parents home some months prior to
the accident that is subject to this case.
May

1989, on July

6,

1989, Billy

Having moved out in

Rogers moved

back

into his

parents' home where he remained until he entered the Navy some
months

later.

On

July

7,

1989, Billy's

parents

went

to

the

state of Washington on vacation and to visit other children and
Billy Rogers was left in charge of his parents' home while they
were out of state.
When Mr. and Mrs. Rogers left for Washinton state, they
gave Billy Rogers

clear, unequivocal

instructions

that, 1) no

Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No. 900900166
Page 2
drinking was to occur in the home, and 2) Billy was not to allow
any of his friends to stay in the home.

Plaintiff overhead the

instructions and agrees they were given.
Billy Rogers and Shane had a party where both got drunk.
Plaintiff and Billy Rogers left in Billy's car to take a friend
home.

After

dropping

off

the

friend, plaintiff

occupied

the

front passenger side of the vehicle, Billy crashed his car into a
tree causing plaintiff injuries.
The basis
Joanne

Rogers

is

of

the

based

plaintiff's
on

control their child Billy.

parental

claim

against

liability

Harvey

for

failure

and
to

The claim is that they had knowledge

of the childs' habitual conduct manifested by evidence of prior
acts which are same or similar to the act complained of.

The

Rogers', based on Billy's past conduct, could reasonably foresee
that if they left town with Billy house sitting he would hold a
party in which alcoholic beverages would be consumed.

They had

both the opportunity and the ability to control Billy's actions
by either

staying

home, or making

care of their home.

other arrangements

for the

Accordingly the Rogers', by virtue of their

special relationship with Billy, would be liable for their own
negligence.
Plaintiff
Machu.
children

relies

heavily

on

the

case

of

Morella

v.

That case considered whether parents who leave teenage
under

poorly

supervised

circumstances

where

drinking
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parties were liable to occur in their absence may be liable for
damages

caused

injures

innocent

That

case

by

found

an

intoxicated

victims
liability

under

while

driving

and

concluded

aged
away

party
from

that

goer

the

who

party.

parents

have

a

legal duty to see that their children are properly supervised in
their absence.
The problem is that the Morella case and the other cases
relied

upon

liability
person

for

is

no

eighteen.

by

plaintiff

failure

to

longer

a

are

on

control
minor

the

subject

minors.

when

he

of

Under
obtains

parental

Utah
the

law
age

a
of

Cases relied upon by plaintiff do not state that a

parent has a duty to reasonably control an adult child.
adult he is responsible for his own behavior.

As an

This would fall

more under the Beach case cited by both parties as footnote 5
states neither attendance of college nor agreement to submit to
certain behavior standards make the student less and autonomous
adult or the institution more a caretaker.

The fact that the

defendant's child Billy was left in care of their home and the
party was at their home does not make Billy less an autonomous
adult.
I hold that the defendants' Harvey and Joanne Rogers, as
a matter of law, did not have a duty to control their son Billy
and

they

are not

liable

for his

torts.

Their

leaving

their

adult son in charge of their home does not constitute actionable
negligence.
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted
DATED this J

day of May, 1992.
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